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We estimate the effects on workforce and location outcomes of the Kalamazoo Promise, a 
generous, place-based college scholarship. Drawing upon administrative unemployment 
insurance wage records merged with individual-level education data, we identify Promise effects 
by comparing eligible to ineligible graduates before and after the Promise’s initiation. We 
supplement this quantitative analysis with surveys and interviews. Despite earlier research 
showing that the Kalamazoo Promise substantially increased degree attainment, we find little 
evidence that the program affected average earnings within 10 years of high school graduation. 
However, the Kalamazoo Promise may have increased the likelihood of eligible graduates 
having earnings, within Michigan, in the middle of the distribution. We discuss the possible role 
of job availability in understanding these patterns and the implications for free-tuition college 
programs as a workforce development tool.   
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Within the past 15 years, place-based college scholarships have become increasingly 
common throughout the country. Unlike traditional merit or need-based scholarship programs, 
place-based college scholarships often have fewer eligibility requirements, are tied to geography 
at a substate level, and have motives of promoting both educational attainment and local 
workforce development (Miller-Adams 2015). This form of financial aid can now be found in 
nearly 200 communities across the country (Miller-Adams et al. 2020). However, the 
effectiveness of place-based scholarships in meeting these goals is predicated on their increasing 
students’ educational attainment as well as improving their employment and earnings. Despite 
the rapid dissemination of these programs, which vary considerably in their structure, research 
has just begun to assess their effectiveness in achieving the first goal, with mostly positive 
results. Research on the second objective—improving labor market outcomes—has been harder 
to come by, in part due to the longer horizon needed for evaluation.1 
In this paper, we examine labor market impacts of the Kalamazoo Promise, one of the 
earliest and most generous place-based college scholarships. Since 2006, the Kalamazoo Promise 
has provided up to 100 percent of tuition and fees—in “first-dollar” terms before other financial 
aid—at any public college or university in Michigan to graduates of the Kalamazoo school 
district. The program is universal in that graduates are eligible if they live within the district and 
have attended since ninth grade—there are no merit or financial need requirements. Previous 
research has found that the program substantially increased college enrollment and college 
 
1 The research here represents one project of the Promise Research Consortium, an effort funded by a 
competitive grant from the Strada Foundation to study workforce outcomes of place-based college scholarships in 
four communities: Kalamazoo; Knox County, Tennessee; Pittsburgh, and Denver.  
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completion (Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 2020). To understand whether these boosts in 
education translate into improved employment and earnings, we merge individual-level 
administrative education records with quarterly wage records from Michigan’s Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) system. We then compare, using difference-in-differences, outcomes between 
individuals eligible and ineligible for the Promise, for cohorts before and after the program was 
in place.  
 Despite finding in an earlier paper that the Kalamazoo Promise increased degree 
attainment by between one-quarter and one-third (Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 2020), our 
current results show that these education gains do not appear to translate into clearly improved 
employment and earnings. We find essentially no change in the likelihood that a Promise-eligible 
individual was employed in Michigan up to 10 years after their high school graduation, and this 
holds for different definitions of employment intensity. Although our estimates are somewhat 
imprecise, at the upper bound, we can reject that the Promise increased year-round employment 
rates (employment in four consecutive quarters) by 8 percentage points 7–10 years after high 
school graduation, relative to a mean of about 30 percent. We also find little  effect on average 
earnings levels, whether we condition on employment or not. Our point estimates for average 
quarterly earnings within the first six years after high school graduation are small and negative—
consistent with increased college enrollment—and although they turn positive at the 7–10-year 
horizon, they remain modest and below conventional levels of statistical significance. 
 Because the conditional mean may mask important effects at other parts of the earnings 
distribution, we also estimate impacts on the likelihood that earnings exceed various thresholds. 
We find Promise-eligible individuals are about 5 percentage points (roughly 6–7 percent) more 
likely to have average quarterly earnings above a range of $4,500–$8,500, conditional on having 
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positive earnings, although these estimates are somewhat imprecise and just miss conventional 
statistical significance levels. However, when we don’t condition on positive earnings and 
instead look over all graduates, we find similar positive impacts that are statistically significant. 
These patterns together suggest the Promise did have some impact on shifting the earnings 
distribution upward.   
 Given the joint economic development goals of place-based scholarships, we also 
investigate whether the Kalamazoo Promise affected individuals’ location choices (conditional 
on being within Michigan). We find that, 4–10 years after high school, Promise-eligible 
individuals were approximately 15 percentage points (18 percent) more likely to live within 10 
miles of downtown Kalamazoo than previous cohorts, and this impact is robust and statistically 
significant. 
 Taken as a whole, our results show mixed impacts of the Kalamazoo Promise as a 
strategy for local economic development. Although eligible individuals increased their degree 
attainment and are more likely to stay in the local area—boosting the share of young, educated 
residents—their employment and earnings prospects have not significantly changed—at least not 
to date. As we discuss below, this pattern of findings contrasts somewhat with other emerging 
research into longer-term outcomes of place-based scholarships. It suggests, however, that 
programs that increase educational attainment may not be sufficient, by themselves, to also 
increase economic mobility.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on college scholarships is rather voluminous, and we focus here on 
describing the most salient studies both for place-based scholarships and longer-term (beyond 
college-going) outcomes.2 
Although few of the nearly 200 place-based college scholarships have been studied, and 
there is doubtless some study bias toward larger, more generous, and more prominent programs, 
research to date has found positive impacts on enrollment and, for more mature programs, often 
degree completion as well. For example, using two forms of difference-in-differences, Bartik, 
Hershbein, and Lachowska (2020) found that the Kalamazoo Promise increased overall 
enrollment by 7–9 percentage points,  bachelor’s degree completion within six years by 7–8 
percentage points, and any credential completion within six years by 10–12 percentage points.3 
Swanson and Ritter (2020), studying the El Dorado (AR) Promise, which closely resembles the 
Kalamazoo scholarship in most features, found similar impacts on both enrollment and degree 
completion. Interestingly, both of these studies found effects on low-income students and 
students of color at least as large as those for higher-income or white students. 
Programs that include some merit requirements or provide funding only for community 
colleges have also been found to increase college enrollment. The Pittsburgh Promise, for 
instance, which has a modest GPA requirement, increased four-year college enrollment for most 
demographic groups (Page and Iriti 2016). Additionally, the Knox Achieves community and 
technical college program, the forerunner to the statewide Tennessee Promise, increased 
 
2 Deming and Dynarski (2010) and Page and Scott-Clayton (2016) offer excellent reviews of recent 
scholarship of grant and loan assistance policies on college success. 
3 Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2020) also summarize research of place-based scholarships on K–12 
enrollment and academic performance, migration, and housing prices. 
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community college enrollment and accumulated college credits, with only slight substitution 
from the four-year college sector (and that diminished over time; Carruthers and Fox 2016). 
Thus, place-based college scholarships, at least the ones studied, can increase measurable 
human capital—perhaps the a priori litmus test for their potential to increase employment and 
earnings. In turn, increases in earnings are the most likely channel through which such programs 
could pay for themselves and deliver net social returns (or a marginal value of social funds; 
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2020).4 As these programs continue to proliferate and “free-tuition” 
college receives growing consideration from policymakers and the public, benefit-cost 
calculations become integral, but the data necessary to make them are often lacking. Indeed, 
several papers have made assumptions for how marginal increases in degree attainment translate 
to later earnings, which generally cannot be observed, at least not over the entire career. Bartik, 
Hershbein, and Lachowksa (2016), for example, make various assumptions about earnings 
profiles by demographic group and education level, in conjunction with the costs of the 
scholarship, to estimate an internal rate of return for the Kalamazoo Promise as high as 11 
percent. Angrist, Autor, and Pallais (2020) apply estimates of the causal return to degree 
attainment on earnings to simulate earnings profiles of beneficiaries of the Susan Thompson 
Buffett Foundation scholarships in Nebraska, finding that projected earnings gains exceed 
program costs for most groups. 
Studies that examine direct impacts of scholarships on employment and earnings are 
rarer, often requiring difficult administrative data linkages and sufficient time to elapse for such 
outcomes to be meaningful. Due to the relative recency of place-based scholarships, very few 
 
4 Place-based scholarships vary in their funding source: some are private, some are public, and some are 
both (see Miller-Adams et al. 2020), hence, the broadening of Hendren and Sprung Keyser’s “public” funds to 
“social” funds. 
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such studies exist. Even studies of workforce outcomes from merit-based and need-based 
scholarships are not common. Two notable examples are longer-term evaluations of the West 
Virginia Promise, a state merit-based program, and the Cal Grant, California’s need- and merit-
based financial aid program. For the first, Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2019) used matched state UI 
wage records and credit bureau data to conclude that, by their late 20s, individuals that had been 
eligible for the scholarship had better credit outcomes and financial health, were more likely to 
be homeowners and live in higher-income neighborhoods, and had 7 percent higher earnings, 
conditional on employment, although this last estimate was imprecise. For the Cal Grant, 
Bettinger et al. (2019) matched federal tax data to state records and found that annual earnings 
were about 5 percent higher among Cal Grant recipients, although this estimate was also 
imprecise. Interestingly, the West Virginia Promise mostly accelerated degree completion rather 
than raising its rate, whereas the Cal Grant did modestly raise degree completion (although by a 
much smaller amount than in Kalamazoo). 
Recent work by Black et al. (2020) looked at long-term impacts not of a scholarship but 
of exogenous increases in federal loan limits. While this increase in liquidity is not strictly 
comparable to the additional income transfer of grant aid, the comparisons are still illustrative. 
Using matched education and UI wage records in Texas, they found higher borrowing limits led 
to greater degree attainment, higher earnings, and decreasing student loan default 8–12 years 
after high school graduation. Denning, Marx, and Turner (2019), using similar data, examine the 
impact of eligibility for Pell Grants with a regression-discontinuity design and find that, among 
first-time students near the cutoff, those with automatic eligibility for the Grant are more likely 
to graduate and have higher earnings seven years after enrollment. In both cases, the magnitude 
of these increases, given the size and type of the policy change, is large relative to the West 
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Virginia and California studies, suggesting geographical differences in labor markets may play a 
role in later outcomes.5  
The study that most resembles the analysis in this paper is Carruthers, Fox, and Jepson 
(2020)’s ongoing research on the Knox Achieves program, a place-based, last-dollar community 
college scholarship in Knox County, Tennessee. Using matched UI wage records from the state, 
they document increased associate degree attainment and an increase in in-state earnings of 
recipients by their mid-20s. Since the return to a bachelor’s degree is even greater than that for 
an associate degree (Zimmerman 2014), we might expect earnings to increase even more from 
the Kalamazoo Promise, but the geographic disparities mentioned above may still be salient.6 
Thus, it is important to know the geographic context of the Kalamazoo Promise. 
III. KALAMAZOO PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE KALAMAZOO PROMISE 
Kalamazoo Public Schools (KPS) is a mostly urban, mid-sized school district in 
southwest Michigan. Like many urban districts, KPS has relatively high poverty, and between 65 
and 70 percent of students in any given year receive free or reduced-price lunch. The district also 
has a high proportion of racial minorities, about 65 percent, split across Blacks (39 percent), 
Hispanics (14 percent), and other (including multiracial) groups (11 percent). These rates are all 
substantially higher than neighboring suburban districts (MI School Data 2021). Unusual among 
 
5 Chakrabarti, Nober, and van der Klaaw (2020) and Chakrabarti, Gorton, and Lovenheim (2020) leverage 
National Student Clearinghouse data and credit bureau data and show, respectively, that state merit aid programs 
decrease student and overall debt by the time individuals are in their late 20s, and that greater state appropriations 
for public colleges effectively reduce tuition and lead to less debt for four-year college students and more degree 
completion and less subsequent default for two-year college students. 
6 The current study, the Carruthers, Fox, and Jepson (2020) study, and two more that are ongoing for the 
Pittsburgh Promise and the Denver Scholarship Fund are part of a competitive grant from Strada Foundation to 
investigate workforce impacts of place-based scholarships. The four programs differ in their features, but they 
collectively represent the first set of analyses of place-based scholarships on longer-term impacts on individuals. 
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similar urban districts in Michigan, however, which have generally lost enrollment over the past 
15 years, KPS has grown from around 10,000 students when the Kalamazoo Promise was 
announced to just shy of 13,000 students during the 2019–2020 school year (MI School Data 
2021).7 Commensurately, the number of annual graduates, across two mainline and one 
alternative high schools, has edged up recently from approximately 500 before the scholarship to 
roughly 700 today.8 
 Announced in November 2005 and taking effect for the high school class of 2006, the 
Kalamazoo Promise (henceforth, Promise) is a scholarship available to all students who graduate 
from KPS, reside in the district, and have been continuously enrolled since the beginning of high 
school. Unlike most student aid, the Promise has neither merit requirements (high school GPA or 
test scores) nor financial need requirements. According to the donors who anonymously fund the 
scholarship, the Promise’s purpose is to improve KPS, attract people to Kalamazoo, and increase 
local college graduates, which should improve workforce outcomes (Miller-Adams 2015). 
Entering its sixteenth year of operation in 2021, the scholarship has awarded over $130 million 
dollars to over 6,000 individual students. 
 A unique feature of the Promise is its simplicity and generosity. To apply for the 
Promise, seniors complete a one-page form asking basic contact information and only a half-
dozen questions. Eligibility is based on residency and enrollment in the district. Students 
continuously enrolled since the beginning of ninth grade receive first-dollar funding (applied 
before any other financial aid) of 65 percent of tuition and fees at any public college or 
 
7 Bartik, Eberts, and Huang (2010) and Hershbein (2013) provide evidence that this enrollment growth was 
in fact caused by the Kalamazoo Promise. 
8 High school graduation rates have also increased, but this seems to be a secular phenomenon experienced 
by similar districts throughout the state. An earlier draft of Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2020) compared such 
Michigan districts and found no detectable impact of the Promise on graduation rates. 
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university in Michigan.9 This share increases on a sliding scale with each additional earlier grade 
of KPS enrollment, reaching 100 percent for students enrolled continuously from kindergarten. 
To maintain eligibility, students enrolled in a postsecondary institution must be enrolled full-time 
(except for attendance at the local community college, where the requirement is half-time 
attendance) and maintain a 2.0 GPA. There are no other financial need or academic merit 
requirements. The funding is available up to 130 credits, a bachelor’s degree, or 10 years after 
high school, whichever comes first. 
IV. DATA AND METHODS 
We draw upon multiple administrative data sources to analyze the impacts of the Promise 
on workforce outcomes of KPS graduates. In order to allow sufficient time for these outcomes to 
be meaningful, we focus on cohorts from the classes of 2003 through 2013. 
A.  KPS and Promise Data 
Our information on individual students comes from KPS, the Kalamazoo Promise, and 
the National Student Clearinghouse. In addition to covering demographics, high school 
academics, and college enrollment, these data allow us to implement our difference-in-
differences identification strategy. More specifically, while we observe Promise eligibility 
directly for graduating classes of 2006 and later, when the Promise was in effect, we need to 
assign “pseudo-eligibility” for earlier cohorts for whether they would have been eligible had the 
Promise been around at that time. KPS records provide a history of student enrollment and 
 
9 Since 2015, the scholarship can be applied at most private colleges and universities within Michigan, with 
the Promise paying the equivalent tuition rate of the University of Michigan and the private college agreeing to pay 
the difference. Additionally, Promise funds can now be applied toward certain non-credential training programs, 
such as apprenticeships. These changes occurred after the cohorts we study in this paper.  
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residency in the district, which allows us to construct a binary Promise eligibility indicator for 
students in earlier cohorts who would have been eligible, according to the rules, had the Promise 
existed for them. Data limitations prevent us from ascertaining the exact fractional scholarship 
for some of the pre-Promise cohorts, and so, as in previous research, we discretize eligibility 
between those with at least a 65 percent scholarship and those with zero scholarship. (For more 
details on these data, see Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowksa 2020 and the web appendix 
thereof.)10 
Table 1 shows the number of KPS graduates from the district’s two mainline and one 
alternative high school from the classes of 2003 through 2013. The middle column shows the 
count of Promise-eligible graduates (or that would have been eligible if the Promise had existed 
in the past), and the third column shows the count of Promise-ineligible graduates.11 Appendix 
Table A1 shows demographic summary statistics (taken from Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 
2020) of the sample, by eligibility status and policy regime. 
B.  Unemployment Insurance Wage Data 
Workforce data from Michigan’s Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA), which cover 
payroll employment in the state, allow us to follow KPS graduates into the labor market. These 
data contain records on earnings from each covered employer an individual worked for in a 
given calendar quarter, the NAICS industry code of the employer, and the ZIP code of both the 
 
10 As noted in Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowksa (2020), the observed administrative eligibility data from 
the Promise do not perfectly match rules-based eligibility based on KPS attendance history largely because the 
Promise administratively granted exceptions to some higher-risk students. A series of robustness checks, from 
dropping individuals with disputed status, to reweighting on observables, to instrumenting actual eligibility with 
rules-based eligibility, did not materially affect college-going outcomes. 
11 As perhaps is not surprising for a universal scholarship, more than 85 percent of graduates in these 
cohorts were eligible for the Promise. 
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worker’s residence and of the business payroll office (from which we can derive the individual’s 
proximity to Kalamazoo). 
Unfortunately, unlike Tennessee, Texas, and a few other states that have well-established 
longitudinal data systems connecting educational and workforce records, Michigan’s system is 
still nascent, and obtaining the UI data required a special matching request to UIA. That agency 
conducted the match based on individual records we securely submitted to them, returning to us 
records spanning the first quarter of 2006 (the earliest quarter that could be matched) through the 
first quarter of 2019. This time range permits us to examine workforce outcomes up to 10 years 
after high school graduation for the pre-Promise and first few post-Promise cohorts, although it 
does preclude us from looking at Promise impacts immediately after high school (as data for the 
pre-Promise cohorts are not available). 
Table 2 shows match rates by cohort, both at the individual level (left section) and by the 
maximum possible number of post-high-school-gradation calendar quarters (right section).12 
Overall, we were able to match 79.2 percent of all KPS graduates to the UI data, with this share 
increasing across cohorts. Conditional on ever being matched, individuals’ average match rate 
across all post-high-school-graduation calendar quarters is more stable across cohorts, at just 
under two-thirds. 
There are several reasons why match rates do not reach 100 percent. To be included in 
the UI data, an individual must work at a job in the state of Michigan covered by UI. While the 
coverage universe includes most employees, it notably excludes some groups, such as the self-
employed (including independent contractors and online platform workers) and those working 
for the federal government (including the military). Based on calculations from the American 
 
12 Appendix Table A2 shows match rates broken down by presumed eligibility and cohort. 
12 
Community Survey (ACS), roughly 3–4 percent of Kalamazoo-area 19–30 year-olds are self-
employed, and another 1 percent work for the federal government. The other significant group 
that lacks coverage in the data are those who work outside the state—either commuters or 
migrants. Between 3–5 percent of the same age group leave Michigan annually, according to the 
ACS. Thus, we might expect between one-third and one-half of the unmatched to be out of 
coverage, but possibly employed, but the most likely reason for the remaining unmatched 
(including in a given quarter but matched overall) is that the individual isn’t working. 
Overall match rates are noticeably lower for pre-Promise cohorts (2003–2005), at roughly 
56 percent, than for Promise cohorts, which are all above 80 percent. This matching gap persists 
consistently with time elapsed since graduation, as shown in Figure 1.13 The differential match 
rates are potentially problematic for the difference-in-differences approach we use, described 
below, but several factors should at least partially mitigate any concerns. 
First, based on conversations with representatives from Michigan’s UI agency, the 
matching procedure used, which relies on a name and date-of-birth bridge to Social Security 
Number (SSN) via driver’s license and state IDs, is incomplete before 2006, the year our data 
begin and, coincidentally, the beginning of the Promise.14 As shown in Appendix Table A2, the 
match rate is lower among pre-Promise cohorts for both presumed-eligible and presumed-
ineligible students, and the differential in match rates between the two eligibility groups is 
similar before and after the Promise. This is at least consistent with a missing at random 
assumption. 
 
13 The sharp jumps and falls in early quarters in Figure 1 are consistent with college enrollment (which we 
confirm in our education data) and summer jobs. The increase in matching across Promise cohorts is consistent with 
the economic recovery following the Great Recession. For the hiring difficulties faced by young people, especially, 
in a recession, see Forsythe (2019).  
14 Michigan does not use SSNs for educational records, and the state developed a crosswalk to develop its 
student longitudinal data system. However, priority in matching was given to more recent cohorts. 
13 
Second, the demographic and academic characteristics of matched individuals are 
generally quite similar to those of the entire sample of high school graduates. Table 3 shows that 
gender, racial, socioeconomic, and high school differences are no more than a few percentage 
points. On the other hand, there is a negative gradient with high school GPA, with academically 
stronger students being slightly less likely to match overall and even less so when weighted by 
quarters since high school. Table 3 also shows the distribution of college start behavior. Student 
who don’t start college within 12 months of high school graduation are slightly less likely to be 
matched, as are students who start college somewhere besides the four most common choices 
(this set includes private and out-of-state colleges). Additionally, fewer quarters are matched for 
students who start at the state flagships, the University of Michigan and Michigan State.15 These 
patterns suggest academic aptitude may be related to matching in the data, a subject to which we 
return below. However, this correlation is not necessarily a threat to our identification, as the 
Promise is universal and without any merit requirements—indeed there is no significant 
difference in eligibility between all high school graduates and those who match. 
Nonetheless, a more direct test of possible bias is whether the probability of matching is 
systematically correlated with Promise eligibility once the program is in effect. Therefore, and 
third, we implement a difference-in-difference specification similar to the one described in the 
next section, estimating the impact of Promise eligibility for post-Promise cohorts on the 
likelihood of matching for each calendar quarter since high school graduation. The point 
estimates (and 95 percent confidence intervals) for this set of regressions are shown in Figure 2. 
In no quarter is the difference-in-differences estimate statistically significant, nor are they jointly 
significant. There thus does not appear to be á priori evidence that the differential match rates 
 
15 As discussed later, students attending these selective institutions are more likely to leave the state at some 
point after they graduate. 
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threaten valid estimation. However, we adopt additional approaches below to further probe this 
assertion. 
C.  Estimation Strategy 
To identify impacts of the Kalamazoo Promise on workforce outcomes, we follow Bartik, 
Hershbein, and Lachowska (2020) in estimating difference-in-differences, comparing eligible 
and ineligible students, before and after the Promise began, holding constant any time-invariant 
pre-Promise differences between students who enrolled in KPS before or after ninth grade. More 
specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
(1) yicst = α + δ1Elig� icst + δ2(After ×Elig� )icst + γcs + xicsβ + uicst, 
where i denotes the individual student, c denotes the graduating cohort, s denotes the high 
school, and t denotes the time period in which we observe the individual. The outcome variable, 
described in more detail below, is denoted by y. 
 In the post-Promise period, Elig�  equals one if the student is observed as eligible 
according to Promise administrative records and zero otherwise; in the pre-Promise period, Elig�  
equals one if the student is eligible based on historical enrollment in KPS and zero otherwise. 
After × Elig�  is an interaction between Elig�  and After (a dummy that equals one if the student 
graduated after the Promise was in effect—the class of 2006 and later—and zero if before). The 
regression also includes graduation-year-by-high-school dummies, γcs, encompassing years 2003 
through 2013 and three high schools. The vector x contains fixed student-level characteristics—
sex, race and ethnicity, and eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch—and u denotes student i’s 
unobservable traits (the error term). The coefficient of greatest interest in Equation (1) is δ2: the 
regression-adjusted difference in average outcomes between Promise-eligible and ineligible 
15 
students, net of pre-Promise differences between students who enrolled before or after ninth 
grade.16 
 Given our quarterly UI data, we focus on the following outcomes: 1) binary employment 
status, defined variously to be at least two, three, and four quarters with positive earnings in a 
four-quarter period; 2) real average quarterly earnings within a four-quarter period17; 3) the 
earnings distribution, whether real average quarterly earnings are above several sequential 
thresholds; and 4) motivated by the local economic development aspects discussed in the 
introduction, whether the individual is within certain concentric circle distance (using ZIP code 
centroids) from Kalamazoo’s central business district. 
 For ease of interpretation, we operationalize the quarterly data into observations at the 
individual-year level. Here, years are since high school graduation, in which for an individual 
who graduated in year t, Q3 and Q4 of year t+k-1 and Q1 and Q2 of year t+k constitute the kth 
year since graduation. We further group our sample into three time horizons: 1–3 years since 
graduation, 4–6 years since graduation, and 7–10 years since graduation. To allow for flexible 
estimation, particularly in regard to the relationship of the controls to the outcome, we estimate 
equation (1) separately for each time horizon. (Conceptually and empirically, years 1–3 represent 
a time of postsecondary enrollment for most Promise students, years 4–6 represent a transition 
from college to the workforce, and years 7–10 represent early career.) Thus, we have between 
three and four (potential) observations per individual for most outcomes, and we allow for 
arbitrary correlation by clustering standard errors at the individual level. 
 
16 We have experimented with including time-varying measures of the state unemployment rate and job 
growth as controls, but these do not affect estimates of δ2, as time-varying aggregate measures are implicitly 
captured by the cohort by high school fixed effects. 
17 We adjust for inflation to year 2018 dollars using the personal consumption expenditures deflator from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
16 
 The validity of our difference-in-differences strategy rests on two primary assumptions. 
The first is that outcomes were trending similarly for eligible and ineligible students before the 
Promise. That is, in a hypothetical world without the Promise, outcomes of eligible and ineligible 
students would have followed a common, parallel trend, conditional on observables. The second 
assumption is that no other change in KPS besides the Promise affected eligible and ineligible 
students’ outcomes in a differential way. Although Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2020) 
thoroughly investigate these assumptions and find them quite plausible, the incomplete UI match 
rates add a wrinkle in that outcomes are not observed for every individual. Thus, there is 
potential for bias in our estimates. We attempt to address this potential bias (besides flexibly 
controlling for covariates) in several ways. 
 First, we create different cuts of the estimation samples as a form of sensitivity analysis. 
In some cases, we restrict the analytic sample to individuals with at least one matched quarter in 
a year to capture effects for people with some minimal presence in the Michigan (UI-covered) 
labor market that year. In others, particularly for the earnings outcomes, we follow existing 
literature (e.g., Scott-Clayton and Zafar 2019) and construct annual measures using only quarters 
with positive earnings. In addition to these ad hoc approaches, we also more systematically 
estimate a sequence of logit regressions to predict match rates for each calendar quarter elapsed 
since high school graduation as a function of high school demographic, academic, and 
neighborhood characteristics. Averaging these predicted rates across quarters for each person, we 
classify individuals in the top half of average predicted match rates as a “high-match-rate” 
sample.18 Interestingly, individuals with top academic credentials (high school GPAs and 
 
18 These predictions are available upon request. Regressors for the prediction included the variables shown 
in Table 3, as well as standardized test scores and characteristics of the Census Tract of the individual’s last known 
KPS address. These latter characteristics include the share of adult residents with a high school diploma, the share 
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standardized test scores) are predicted to be less likely to match in the data, and this gap 
increases with time horizon. Because these individuals also have high potential earnings, the 
pattern is consistent with them being more likely to leave the state (and the scope of the data). 
However, low predicted match rates were also found among the academically weakest students 
in our sample, implying both positive and negative selection. In fact, the individuals most likely 
to match regularly were students of middling academic preparation who attended either the local 
two- or four-year college. 
Analyzing these samples separately yields a conceptually different average treatment 
effect on the treated than analyzing the full sample. Based on the findings in Bartik, Hershbein, 
and Lachowksa (2020), the high-match-rate sample constitutes individuals who were more likely 
to be on the margin of completing a degree because of the Promise. To the extent that degree 
attainment is a principal mechanism of improved labor market outcomes, which seems plausible, 
the high-match-rate sample may provide estimates closer to marginal treatment effects on the 
treated that are of particular policy interest. 
Second, and perhaps more pertinent to heterogeneity, we also estimate impacts on 
subgroups defined by gender, race/ethnicity, and eligibility for free and reduced-price lunch. 
These characteristics are slightly correlated with match rates (Table 3), but in conjunction with 
the estimated heterogeneity of Promise impacts on degree attainment (Bartik, Hershbein, and 
Lachowksa 2020), differential workforce impacts are potentially informative when it comes to 
probing issues of nonrepresentativeness, as well. 
Third, we supplement the quantitative analysis of UI data with qualitative telephone 
interviews of individuals we were able to identify as having left Michigan (and thus the UI data) 
 
with at least a bachelor’s degree, the poverty rate, the share of occupied homes that are rented, and the share of 
family households that are led by single parents. 
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through Promise contact information and a snowball sample approach. These conversations 
focused on motivations for working within or outside the state, as well as the nature of 
employment and its relation to educational attainment. These interviews, described more 
thoroughly in the discussion section, provide contextual information on students not captured in 
the earnings analysis and thus a more holistic look at the overall workforce impact of the 
Kalamazoo Promise. 
V. RESULTS 
A.  Employment 
 One way to capture employment would be to check for any positive earnings in a given 
year—that is, at least one quarter with positive employment. However, since an individual who 
does not work in a given quarter will not have a UI record that quarter—and thus not match that 
quarter—this definition is essentially identical to whether an individual has a match in the data 
that year. Because Figure 2 already indicated that the Kalamazoo Promise was not associated 
with overall match rates, an outcome defined this way is not particularly interesting. 
 Therefore, we capture the effect of the Promise on employment as measured by positive 
earnings in (successively) two, three, and all four quarters in a year. This measure intrinsically 
also captures the intensive margin, or intensity, of employment. The three panels of Table 4 
show estimates of δ2 for each of these employment intensities. 
 In general, we find minimal impacts on any of these employment intensities, at any 
horizon from immediately after high school to 7–10 years after. The first three columns show 
effects at these time horizons for the full, rectangularized sample, in which unmatched person-
quarters are treated as implicit zeroes. The point estimates, although all positive, are uniformly 
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small, below 2 percentage points. Moreover, they are not especially precise. For example, in 
column 3 of panel C, we cannot rule out an all-quarter employment increase at the 7–10-year 
horizon of up to about 8 percentage points (26 percent of the base) or a decrease of up to about 6 
percentage points (20 percent). This relative imprecision may in part be due to inclusion of 
unmatched person-quarters; focusing on samples with greater match rates—and thus 
demonstrated labor force presence in Michigan—could yield estimates more in line with an 
intensive margin of employment interpretation. Columns 4 through 6 thus focus on the sample 
with high predicted match rates (as described on page 16), but estimates and inference are both 
similar to the full sample.19 Because so many of these estimates cluster around 0, even though 
somewhat noisily, we infer that strong Promise impacts on employment—at least in Michigan—
are unlikely. 
B.  Earnings Levels 
Table 5 shows the impact of the Promise on real average quarterly earnings (in levels). 
Panel A again uses the full rectangularized sample that treats unmatched quarters as implicit 
zeros (before averaging across the year), while panel B restricts the sample to quarters with 
positive earnings. The estimates in panel A thus capture changes in both the extensive and 
intensive margins, while those in panel B capture changes in the latter. In practice, the distinction 
turns out not to matter much. Across the three time horizons in columns 1 through 3, the patterns 
are similar for both panels: small negative point estimates in the two earlier horizons (when 
individuals were probably still enrolled in school; Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 2020), and 
 
19 As another robustness check, in Appendix Table A3, we condition the sample on an individual having at 
least one quarter of positive earnings in a given year (signaling minimal labor force attachment in Michigan). We 
find slightly negative estimates at 4–6 years, when many individuals are still enrolled in college, and slightly 
positive estimates at 7–10 years, but none is statistically significant. 
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a somewhat larger, but still statistically insignificant, positive estimate in the later horizon. The 
estimate of $489 in column 3 of panel A is a substantively large 20 percent of the mean earnings 
level of $2,441 (which includes many zeros), although the t-statistic is only 1.55. The estimate in 
panel B of $389 is off a base of $6,354, or a modest 6 percent, when only positive-earnings 
quarters are included, but the confidence intervals are wide enough that proportional impacts 
between −10 percent and (+)22 percent cannot be rejected. The picture is unchanged in the high-
match sample of columns 4 through 6, as well as in the sample that includes only individuals 
with at least one matched quarter per year (Appendix Table A4). While these results do not 
preclude the possibility of the Kalamazoo Promise raising individuals’ earnings by their mid-to-
late 20s, they do not represent compelling evidence for such a boost either.  
C.  Earnings Distribution 
The effects on average earnings levels shown in Table 5 may mask important impacts at 
other parts of the earnings distribution, especially since the distribution is highly skewed, with a 
long right tail. The Promise, for example, could meaningfully raise earnings in the bottom half of 
the distribution while not significantly affecting the mean. There are many ways to investigate 
this possibility, including several variants of quantile regression, but many of these methods 
require several additional assumptions, can be difficult to interpret, or both (Callaway and Li 
2019). Instead, we adopt a simpler approach of discretizing earnings into $500 bins, ranging 
between $2,000 and $12,000, and defining a sequence of binary indicators for whether an 
individual’s real average quarterly earnings in a year exceed the floor of each bin.20 This 
approach allows us to use equation (1) in the standard way, as a linear probability model, with a 
 
20 Michigan’s minimum wage ranged from $5.15 in 2006 (the federal minimum) to $9.45 in 2019; adjusted 
to year 2018 dollars, the range is $6.25 to $9.31. The $2000 threshold thus corresponds to between 215 and 320 
hours of minimum wage work a quarter, or roughly 16 to 25 hours per week. 
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straightforward interpretation of δ2 representing the change in the likelihood that a Promise-
eligible individual has earnings in that bin or a higher one. 
We illustrate these estimates graphically in Figure 3. Because we don’t have a balanced 
panel for the pre-Promise cohorts, we focus on the 4–6- and 7–10-year horizons. Panels A and B 
show the distributional effects for these respective horizons, using the full sample and treating 
unmatched quarters as implicit zeros. Panels C and D show effects based on the sample that 
includes only quarters with positive earnings.21 
Panel A shows near-zero effects throughout the earnings distribution for KPS graduates 
when they are approximately 22–24 years old. But many individuals are still enrolled in college 
at this horizon. Thus, panel B focuses on the horizon when most graduates are 25–28 years old. 
Here, we see relatively sizable increases, which steadily grow until approximately the midpoint 
of the earnings range shown. Put differently, there are minimal impacts at the bottom threshold 
of $2,000 per quarter (which, because of the inclusion of implicit zeros, only about one-third of 
this sample exceeds). But there are impacts of between 4 and 6 percentage points at thresholds 
ranging from $4,000 to $10,000 per quarter, and some of these impacts—particularly in the 
upper two-thirds of the range—are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Given the low mean 
shares exceeding thresholds in this range (e.g., the mean is 13.7 percent for the $7,000 
threshold), the proportional impacts are considerable: the increases are between 40 and 60 
percent in the fraction of Promise-eligible individuals with earnings at annualized rates of up to 
about $40,000.22 Nonetheless, in absolute terms, the estimates are consistent with only about 25 
additional graduates having annualized earnings above that threshold.   
 
21 Appendix Figure A1 repeats Figure 3 but with the high-match-rate sample. 
22 A lack of earnings impacts at the mean (Table 5) may be due to the well-known large right skew of 
earnings. 
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These impacts implicitly include effects of both employment and earnings. By restricting 
the estimation sample to quarters with positive earnings in panels C and D, we focus on the 
extensive margin of earnings impacts. Panel C shows negative impacts in the 2–4 percentage 
point range throughout the distribution, but none is statistically significant, and as noted above, 
the timing is early. For the 7–10-year horizon shown in panel D, the general pattern is roughly 
consistent with that in panel B. The Promise raises by about 4–5 percentage points the likelihood 
that individuals surpass quarterly earnings of $4,000 to $9,500. However, due to the smaller 
sample from the conditional restriction, none of these estimates is statistically significant (some 
just miss significance at the 0.10 level). In proportional terms, given the much higher means 
from excluding implicit zeros, the impacts are smaller than in panel B—on the order of a 7 
percent increase.23 
These distributional impacts are somewhat more salutary than the lack of earnings effects 
at the mean, but they are also relatively modest and not especially precisely estimated. The 
Kalamazoo Promise may have raised earnings in the middle part of the distribution, but the 
evidence is not as compelling as its effect on degree attainment (Bartik, Hershbein, and 
Lachowska 2020). 
D.  Location Choice 
As noted above, place-based scholarships differ from traditional merit- and need-based 
scholarships in that they often contain an explicit workforce and economic development 
motivation beyond greater human capital attainment. That is, the goal isn’t just boosting degrees 
but increasing the share of high school graduates with college degrees who choose to work and 
 
23 Estimates for the high-match-rate sample (Appendix Figure A1) are generally similar to those shown in 
Figure 3, although, consistent with the smaller sample, the estimates are noisier. 
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live in the local community. Thus, it is of policy interest to understand how the Kalamazoo 
Promise affected KPS graduates’ location choices. We use residential ZIP code information in 
the UI data and calculate distances between the centroids of the residential ZIP code and that of 
Kalamazoo’s central business district.24 We discretize these distances into the following 
categories: within five miles, within 10 miles, within 20 miles, and within 50 miles. The lowest 
threshold roughly captures the immediate KPS area, while the highest threshold is near a 
maximum plausible commuting distance. We are able to observe residential ZIP codes outside 
Michigan if the individual works for a company covered by Michigan UI (i.e., a commuter into 
the state), but not within-Michigan residential ZIP codes if the individual does not work for a 
company covered by Michigan UI. The latter case includes individuals who may be living in the 
state but not working. We annualize the quarterly ZIP code reports by taking the (first) mode 
across quarters, so even a single-quarter match within a year will permit a valid observation. 
Table 6 shows Promise impacts on the probability of an individual living within the 
above-specified distances from the city’s central business district. Unlike those for employment 
and earnings, these estimates show stronger evidence of a Promise effect. In the first three 
columns of panel A, the Promise appears to raise the probability of living within five miles of 
downtown Kalamazoo by 9–13 percentage points (15–23 percent), although only the estimate at 
the 4–6-year horizon is marginally statistically significant, and even that finding is not robust to 
the high-match-rate sample (column 5). The estimates are stronger, however, in panels B and C, 
which display impacts at the 10- and 20-mile thresholds, respectively. Across both the full and 
high-match-rate samples, Promise-eligible individuals are between 9 and 17 percentage points 
 
24 Technically, we use centroids from ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs), available from the Census 
Bureau’s Gazetteer files. ZCTAs matched ZIPs exactly in nearly all cases. We construct distances using the latitude-
longitude coordinates in the Gazetteer files and the Stata user-written program, -geodist- (Picard 2010). 
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(11 and 22 percent) more likely to live within 10 miles of Kalamazoo 4–10 years after high 
school, and between 11 and 19 percentage points (14 and 21 percent) more likely to live within 
20 miles. These results are almost all statistically significant at conventional thresholds, 
sometimes at better than the 0.01 level. There are also positive effects at the 50-mile threshold, 
arguably near an upper commuting limit. As shown in Appendix Table A5, all of these results 
are also robust to a sample that includes only individuals with at least one matched quarter per 
year. 
These findings indicate that the Promise has been successful in retaining more (Promise-
eligible) KPS graduates in the area, especially when the area loosely matches a labor market.25 
Nonetheless, the earlier results suggest that, although more individuals are staying local, they 
aren’t more likely to be employed or earning higher wages, and this may limit the program’s 
potential as a tool for local economic development. 
E.  Heterogeneity 
 Finally, we examine effects separately by race, sex, and eligibility for free and reduced-
price lunch, our proxy for family income status. Table 7 shows longer-term Promise effects (7–
10 years after high school) by subgroup for four outcomes: minimum labor force attachment, 
average quarterly earnings, whether quarterly earnings are above a threshold of $4,000, and 
whether the former student lived within 10 miles of Kalamazoo’s central business district. These 
results are broadly consistent with our overall findings and are of the expected sign in almost all 
cases. However, our subgroup estimates are less precise than those of the full samples, and so 
meaningful inference or comparisons between groups is difficult. 
 
25 Grand Rapids, for example, is a large, relatively fast-growing metro area that is about 50 miles north of 
Kalamazoo. Stronger results at the 10- and 20-mile horizons suggest less movement by the Promise-eligible to other 
nearby metros. 
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 The first row of Table 7 shows positive point estimates for labor-force attachment 
(defined as having four quarters of positive earnings in a 12-month period) for all subgroups with 
the exception of racial minorities, who essentially saw no change (a −0.3 percent reduction from 
their mean). As with our estimates of labor force attachment on the full sample, no estimate 
among the subgroups is statistically significant, nor are estimates meaningfully different between 
groups. Due to imprecision, we generally cannot rule out changes of up to 10 percentage points 
on either side of the point estimate, which can represent up to 30 percent of the control mean. 
Unfortunately, the measure of labor force attachment is simply too noisy to draw conclusions 
about Promise impacts on subgroups. 
 Estimates on average quarterly earnings, in the second row, are universally positive 
across groups and somewhat more precise than those for labor force attachment. Although the 
relative impacts are of meaningful size—increases of 28 percent for women (=470.2/1,702), 18 
percent for men, 36 percent for whites, 14 percent for minorities, and 22 percent for low-income 
people—only the result for whites is marginally significant. Likewise, the Promise’s impact for 
earning above the threshold of $4,000 per quarter is also positive for each subgroup, with the 
largest effect for women, who experienced a 33 percent increase in the likelihood of earning 
above the threshold. Despite these sizable estimates, confidence intervals are wide, and we 
cannot rule out that no meaningful differences exist between groups for these outcomes, or that 
the true differences are in fact much larger. 
The last row of Table 7 examines effects on the likelihood of each group living within 10 
miles from the city’s central business district. Estimates for this outcome diverge more than for 
the earlier labor market outcomes, with men 20 percentage points (33 percent), whites 23 
percentage points (31 percent), and those who had been low-income students 16 percentage 
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points (18 percent) more likely to live closer to Kalamazoo. All three of these estimates are 
statistically significant. Women, racial minorities, and those who had been higher-income 
students were also more likely to live nearby in the post-Promise era, but the effects were weaker 
and not statistically significant. However, again because of imprecision, we cannot reject that 
effects across the groups are the same. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
As discussed previously, state UI wage records do not fully capture the impact of the 
Kalamazoo Promise on workforce outcomes, particularly around the question of where students 
are employed after graduation. Because the UI data do not contain information on students who 
leave the state, relying wholly on them for inference could skew our knowledge about the kinds 
of jobs Kalamazoo Promise students have taken, and the data provide no information on factors 
leading to the decision to leave the state. 
 Thus, we have also begun conducting a supplemental study (still underway) to 
understand the employment experiences of KPS graduates employed outside Michigan. More 
specifically, we targeted KPS graduates from the classes of 2006−2014 from the following 
categories for a semi-structured telephone interview: 
• Those who used the Kalamazoo Promise at eligible in-state institutions who subsequently 
secured employment outside of Michigan.   
• Those who attended college or university outside the state (without the Kalamazoo 
Promise) and are currently (or were previously) employed out of state.  
• Those who did not attend or complete college and moved out of state. 
 
We initially began with graduates known to have met one of these criteria by the authors 
or Promise staff, then expanded the sample using the “snowball survey” technique by asking 
27 
participants to assist in identifying other potential subjects.26 To date, 36 (of a planned 50) 
interviews have been completed. Of interest are the conditions leading respondents to take 
employment out of state; the nature of their employment, including wages; and whether the 
respondents have current plans to return to Michigan or the local community. 
 Most of the individuals interviewed attended either the local four-year college, Western 
Michigan University, or one of the state flagships, Michigan State University and University of 
Michigan (Ann Arbor campus); a few also attended college out of state and thus did not use the 
Promise. Based on our estimations of the match rate, described above, this college distribution is 
aligned with individuals who were less likely to be found in the UI data. 
 Interviewed students are geographically dispersed, spanning 24 cities in 16 states, plus 
one person residing outside the United States. Not all traveled far: six individuals were living and 
working in Chicago, about 150 miles from Kalamazoo. Most of the interviewed students were 
faring quite well economically: more than one-third reported annual earnings over $75,000, and 
more than one-fifth reported earning over $100,000. These earnings levels are much higher than 
found in the state UI data (where less than 2 percent had annualized earnings over $75,000), 
strongly suggesting that the interview sample—and quite likely most of the population of out-of-
state KPS graduates—is positively selected on earnings capacity.27 
 Indeed, just over half of the respondents cited an employment offer and a more 
professionally advantageous and/or lucrative nature of work than was available within Michigan 
as reasons for moving out of state. Others expressed a preference for leaving their home state for 
 
26 Although the interview questions are not particularly sensitive (the instrument appears in the Appendix), 
we took steps to preserve subjects’ privacy, and only one of the authors—the interviewer—could match names to 
responses. 
27 Given the strong correlation between academic aptitude and earnings capacity, this also suggests that the 
out-of-state KPS graduate population may not have been marginal in terms of the Promise causally increasing their 
likelihood of degree attainment. Put differently, the out-of-state residents are not the population of individuals for 
whom we would expect the largest Promise effect on earnings.  
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personal development. All of them, however, held internships in fields related to their jobs for at 
least one semester or summer while in college. These internships were also largely, but not 
entirely, out of state. In addition to finding jobs through internships, many interviewees reported 
obtaining employment offers through university career offices, career fair networking, and 
internet job boards. Business and engineering graduates, who tend to have high earnings, were 
especially likely to have secured employment through events or services offered through their 
department’s career office. 
 These qualitative findings indicate that the availability of local (or at least within-state) 
jobs may play an important role in retaining graduates of a place-based college scholarship—
especially the more successful ones. In conjunction with the analysis of the UI data, these 
patterns suggest that place-based scholarships, even when they significantly boost degree 
attainment, need not lead to improved labor market outcomes for affected students or to 
successful graduates staying in the community and contributing to economic development. The 
strength of the local job market may be an important mediator. The Kalamazoo metro area had 
about as many jobs in 2018 as it did in 2000, whereas the Knoxville metro area had seen its job 
total grow by 20 percent over the same horizon.28 Moreover, growth in professional & business 
services and education & health services—the sectors in which the largest shares of recent 
college graduates work29—each grew by more than 50 percent in Knoxville, but only by about 
20 percent and 40 percent, respectively in Kalamazoo. The patterns are similar if the 
comparisons are between the two states rather than the two metro areas. Thus, the positive 
 
28 Employment changes are calculated from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics State and Metro Area 
Employment series. 
29 Based on the six states reporting in the U.S. Census Bureau’s Post-Secondary Employment Outcomes 
program, a cooperative effort between select higher education institution systems that allow education records of 
their graduates to be merged to the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, an integrated 
panel of all states’ UI data. The top industries of employment are remarkably consistent across states and colleges. 
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employment impacts of the Knox Achieves program found by Carruthers, Fox, and Jepsen 
(2020) could be related to Knoxville’s faster growing labor market for college graduates. This 
hypothesis warrants future research, especially if place-based scholarships are intended to 
revitalize economic areas. 
 In the near future, we hope to expand our interview sample to include KPS graduates who 
pursued associate degrees, certificates, and other forms of job training and are currently 
employed outside of Michigan. We also aim to add context for differences by race and family 
income background. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have analyzed workforce outcomes from the Kalamazoo Promise, one 
of the earliest and most generous place-based college scholarships, a model that has expanded to 
hundreds of programs nationwide. Despite the large increases in educational attainment the 
Promise induced (Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 2020), we find that these educational gains 
have not translated into clear and convincing gains in employment and earnings. Indeed, we find 
almost no evidence of employment increases at the extensive or intensive margins and only weak 
evidence of earnings gain at the mean. Although earnings increases in the middle of the 
distribution receive more empirical support, they are not particularly strong, either.  
Given that Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2020) find degree attainment increases (at 
the six-year post-high school horizon) of 10–12 percentage points, two-thirds of which are from 
bachelor’s degrees, what earnings impact might we expect, given previous research? The causal 
impact of a bachelor’s degree on earnings in one’s late 20s has been estimated to be on the order 
of 68 percent, and that of an associate degree about 29 percent, both relative to only a high 
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school diploma (Hershbein, Kearney, and Pardue 2020a, 2020b; Zimmerman 2014). Assuming 
no other earning impacts other than through these degree attainment channels, a back of the 
envelope calculation suggests an expected average earnings increase of 0.075×0.68 + 0.035×0.29 
= 0.061, or 6.1 percent. This is a lower bound, as college enrollment and credit attainment not 
leading to a degree also have some labor market returns (Hershbein, Kearney, and Pardue 
2020b). This figure is pretty close to the modal point estimate for the longer time horizon in 
Table 5, so it is quite possible that we simply lack statistical power to detect reasonable earnings 
impacts. Nevertheless, our point estimates for earnings effects among a sample predicted to have 
a high match rate in the UI data—and one for which Promise degree completion impacts are 
especially likely to be concentrated—are smaller, when we would expect them to be larger. 
A conservative inference would thus imply that there is not compelling evidence that the 
Kalamazoo Promise increased earnings of Promise-eligible high school graduates, even if this 
outcome cannot be rejected. What might explain this lack of impact, especially when emerging 
evidence suggests more salutary impacts from the predecessor to the community-college 
scholarship Tennessee Promise (Carruthers, Fox, and Jepsen 2020)? Although more research is 
needed, we suspect that local labor markets might be important. The Kalamazoo area, and the 
state of Michigan more generally, has not seen the recent job or population growth of Knoxville, 
Tennessee. If local job opportunities are lacking, it is possible that place-based college 
scholarships could very well lead to increased educational attainment but not improved 
employment and earnings. As more states adopt explicit education goals to reach a certain share 
of their working-age population with post-secondary education credentials, our results serve as a 
cautionary reminder that greater educational attainment by itself may not be sufficient to lead to 
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NOTE: Graduating totals by class are shown in Table 1. The series show, for each graduating KPS cohort, the 
average match rate by calendar quarter elapsed since high school graduation. 
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Figure 2  Quarterly UI Match Rates are Uncorrelated with Promise Eligibility 
 
NOTE: Specification is as in equation (1) in the text, where the dependent variable equals 1 if an individual matches 
in the UI data in a given calendar quarter, and 0 if not. Regressors include the interaction of Promise eligibility with 
an indicator for being in a Promise cohort (the estimated coefficients of which are shown), cohort indicators, and 
indicators for sex, race/ethnicity, high school, and free/reduced-price lunch status. Ninety-five percent confidence 
intervals (shaded areas) are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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Figure 3  Promise Effects on Earnings Distribution 
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D. 7–10 years post-high school graduation: Only matched person-quarters sample
 
NOTE: The panels show Promise effects [from equation (1) in the text] on the probability, in percentage points, that 
an individual’s real average quarterly earnings exceed the threshold shown (the solid blue lines). Panels A and B 
treat unmatched quarters as implicit zeros, while Panels C and D include only matched quarters in creating the 
dependent variable. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals (the dashed blue lines) are based on standard errors 
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Table 1  KPS High School Graduates and Promise (Pseudo-) Eligibility 
 
Year Graduates Eligible Ineligible 
2003 525 0 (442) 525 (83) 
2004 551 0 (448) 551 (103) 
2005 392 0 (345) 392 (47) 
2006 (1st Promise cohort) 449 368 81 
2007 504 435 69 
2008 484 415 69 
2009 466 390 76 
2010 498 431 67 
2011 507 433 74 
2012 526 461 65 
2013 513 472 41     
Total 5,415 4,640 775 
NOTE: Numbers represent authors’ calculations of the number of graduates receiving high school diplomas 
(excluding alternative education programs) from KPS and eligibility for the Promise. We determine eligibility (a 
tuition subsidy of at least 65 percent) based on residence and continuous enrollment from KPS records. See text 
for eligibility assignment rules. For 2003–2005, the numbers in parentheses indicate the number of students that 
would (would not) have fulfilled eligibility requirements, even though the Promise did not yet exist. The lower 
graduate count in 2005 is in large part due to the alternative high school being closed that year.  




Table 2  KPS Grads and Match Rates in UI Data 
 
Graduating 








2003 525 283 53.9% 53 33.9 64.0% 
2004 551 321 58.3% 53 33.1 62.5% 
2005 392 224 57.1% 53 34.0 64.1% 
2006* 449 362 80.6% 52 32.4 62.3% 
2007 504 432 85.7% 48 29.7 61.9% 
2008 484 413 85.3% 44 28.0 63.6% 
2009 466 405 86.9% 40 26.6 66.4% 
2010 498 440 88.4% 36 22.6 62.8% 
2011 507 450 88.8% 32 21.1 65.8% 
2012 526 478 90.9% 28 19.0 67.9% 
2013 513 483 94.2% 24 16.3 68.0% 
Total 5,415 4,291 79.2% 
   
NOTE: Graduating totals by class are shown in Table 1. “Matched” and “Match rate” represent the number of 
graduates and the percentage of graduates, respectively, by class, that are ever matched in the UI data. (See text for 
description of UI coverage.) “Total quarters” represents the maximum number of post-high-school-graduation 
calendar quarters a member of a given class could theoretically be matched in the UI data, “Mean # quarters appear” 
is the average number of quarters matched by class, conditional on ever matching, and “Avg match rate” is the 
percentage of quarters matched. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS and Michigan UI administrative data. 
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Table 3  Characteristics of KPS Grads Overall and Among UI Matched 
  
High school 
grads UI match 
Quarter-person 
matched 
Male 47.1% 50.8% 50.6% 
Black 41.1% 43.9% 44.4% 
Hispanic 7.0% 6.3% 5.8% 
Other race/ethnicity 51.9% 49.8% 49.7% 
Free/reduced-price lunch 50.7% 53.3% 53.1% 
HS #1 51.3% 51.6% 51.5% 
HS #2 40.3% 39.7% 40.3% 
GPA <2.0 22.1% 24.1% 23.5% 
GPA 2.0–2.5 18.0% 19.2% 20.5% 
GPA 2.5–3.0 19.1% 19.4% 21.1% 
GPA 3.0–3.5 19.7% 19.0% 18.7% 
GPA >3.5 21.1% 18.3% 16.2% 
No college ≤ 12 months of HS grad 23.1% 20.2% 20.6% 
Start at local 2-year (KVCC) 29.9% 32.8% 36.4% 
Start at local 4-year (WMU) 19.9% 20.5% 22.0% 
Start at Michigan State 6.7% 7.2% 5.5% 
Start at University of Michigan 4.5% 4.4% 3.2% 
Start elsewhere 16.0% 14.9% 12.4% 
Promise-eligible 88.8% 90.6% 90.6% 
NOTE: The “High school grads” column includes the 5,415 individuals from the “Total” column in Table 2, the “UI 
match” column includes the 4,291 individual from the “Matched” column in Table 2, and the “Quarter-person 
matched” column includes the 4,291 individuals from the “Matched” column in Table 2 but weighted by the number 
of total calendar quarters with a record in the UI data. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS, NSC, and Michigan UI administrative data. 
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Table 4  Promise Effects on Employment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample High-match sample 
 1–3 years 4–6 years 7–10 years 1–3 years 4–6 years 7–10 years 
Panel A: ≥ 2 quarters 
      
 0.0168 0.0102 0.0040 0.0120 −0.0125 0.0175 
 (0.0396) (0.0388) (0.0405) (0.0571) (0.0551) (0.0583) 
Mean dep. variable 0.375 0.393 0.376 0.445 0.487 0.472 
R2 0.055 0.096 0.092 0.045 0.081 0.075 
N 14,641 16,242 16,516 7,662 8,385 8,118 
Panel B: ≥ 3 quarters       
 0.0190 0.0078 0.0143 0.0184 −0.0171 0.0137 
 (0.0292) (0.0373) (0.0396) (0.0414) (0.0528) (.0570) 
Mean dep. variable 0.174 0.348 0.344 0.212 0.432 0.431 
R2 0.082 0.081 0.079 0.083 0.071 0.067 
N 14,641 16,242 16,516 7,662 8,385 8,118 
Panel C: ≥ 4 quarters       
 0.0168 0.0162 0.0095 0.0229 0.0039 0.0176 
 (0.0265) (0.0343) (0.0356) (0.0376) (0.0490) (0.0520) 
Mean dep. variable 0.137 0.281 0.303 0.166 0.350 0.375 
R2 0.060 0.062 0.068 0.062 0.058 0.080 
N 14,641 16,242 16,516 7,662 8,385 8,118 
NOTE: Each cell represents a point estimate and the standard error from a separate regression. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by individual are in parentheses; each observation is a person-year. The 
dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether an individual has positive earnings in at least the specified 
number of quarters (by panel) in a year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS, NSC, and Michigan UI administrative data. 
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Table 5  Promise Effects on Earnings Levels  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample High-match sample 
 1–3 years 4–6 years 7–10 years 1–3 years 4–6 years 7–10 years 
Panel A: All person-quarters 
 −90.7 −14.3 488.8 −148.9 −88.8 245.0 
 (145.6) (206.5) (315.9) (216.8) (296.2) (425.6) 
Mean dep. variable 1137 1615 2441 1453 1926 2770 
R2 0.033 0.065 0.056 0.027 0.066 0.059 
N 14,641 16,242 16,516 7,662 8,385 8,118 
Panel B: Only matched person-quarters 
 −112.8 −293.7 388.8 −246.0 −134.5 30.7 
 (233.5) (295.4) (538.9) (305.4) (395.9) (593.7) 
Mean dep. variable 2738 4029 6354 3007 3941 5708 
R2 0.047 0.036 0.056 0.055 0.048 0.045 
N 9,428 10,327 9,263 5,445 5,978 5,365 
NOTE: Each cell represents a point estimate and the standard error from a separate regression. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by individual are in parentheses; each observation is a person-year. The 
dependent variable is the inflation-adjusted ($2018 PCE) average quarterly earnings of the individual in a year. 
Panel A uses a sample that treats missing person-quarters as implicit zeros, while panel B uses a sample that 
includes only matched person-quarters with positive earnings. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS, NSC, and Michigan UI administrative data. 
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Table 6  Promise Effects on Location Choice 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample High-match sample 
 1–3 years 4–6 years 7–10 years 1–3 years 4–6 years 7–10 years 
Panel A: ≤ 5 miles 
      
 0.088 0.132* 0.091 0.032 0.091 0.064 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.082) (0.086) (0.089) (0.104) 
Mean dep. variable 0.604 0.586 0.582 0.617 0.603 0.613 
R2 0.043 0.050 0.053 0.055 0.060 0.053 
N 7,308 5,888 4,668 4,215 3,465 2,986 
Panel B: ≤ 10 miles       
 0.093 0.174*** 0.122* 0.050 0.162** 0.093 
 (0.058) (0.056) (0.066) (0.072) (0.071) (0.085) 
Mean dep. variable 0.804 0.788 0.786 0.847 0.844 0.844 
R2 0.047 0.050 0.057 0.057 0.060 0.058 
N 7,308 5,888 4,668 4,215 3,465 2,986 
Panel C: ≤ 20 miles       
 0.060 0.152*** 0.114* 0.046 0.191*** 0.141* 
 (0.056) (0.051) (0.060) (0.069) (0.061) (0.074) 
Mean dep. variable 0.854 0.838 0.836 0.896 0.891 0.890 
R2 0.037 0.036 0.042 0.048 0.052 0.056 
N 7,308 5,888 4,668 4,215 3,465 2,986 
Panel D: ≤ 50 miles       
 0.041 0.103** 0.078 0.030 0.126*** 0.083 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.049) (0.054) (0.047) (0.062) 
Mean dep. variable 0.905 0.894 0.890 0.935 0.933 0.930 
R2 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.037 0.037 
N 7,308 5,888 4,668 4,215 3,465 2,986 
NOTE: Each cell represents a point estimate and the standard error from a separate regression. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by individual are in parentheses; each observation is a person-year. The 
dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the mode of an individual’s residential ZIP code in a year was 
within the specified distance (by panel) from Kalamazoo’s central business district. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS, NSC, and Michigan UI administrative data. 
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Table 7  Promise Effects by Sex, Race, and Family Income Background, 7–10 years after 
High School Graduation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Men Women Whites Minorities Non-FRL FRL 
Panel A: ≥ 4 quarters employed      
 0.0219 0.0056 0.0558 −0.0009 0.0117 0.0308 
 (0.0545) (0.0464) (0.0594) (0.0444) (0.0568) (0.0472) 
Mean dep. variable 0.380 0.235 0.300 0.308 0.315 0.282 
R2 0.061 0.087 0.063 0.092 0.052 0.101 
N 7,764 8,752 8,280 8,236 8,550 7,946 
Panel B: Avg qtrly earnings      
 576.6 470.2 920.4* 306.4 730.1 467.6 
 (573.7) (349.9) (537.0) (387.7) (545.1) (395.6) 
Mean dep. variable 3,276 1,702 2,577 2,250 2,616 2,111 
R2 0.043 0.079 0.062 0.073 0.050 0.084 
N 7,764 8,752 8,280 8,236 8,550 7,946 
Panel C: Earnings ≥ $4000      
 0.028 0.059 0.050 0.045 0.049 0.053 
 (0.053) (0.043) (0.056) (0.043) (0.055) (0.044) 
Mean dep. variable 0.322 0.177 0.248 0.241 0.259 0.218 
R2 0.045 0.087 0.072 0.065 0.051 0.082 
N 7,764 8,752 8,280 8,236 8,550 7,946 
Panel D: ≤ 10 miles       
 0.202** 0.028 0.226* 0.056 0.062 0.157** 
 (0.099) (0.089) (0.122) (0.075) (0.116) (0.075) 
Mean dep. variable 0.757 0.825 0.726 0.895 0.741 0.870 
R2 0.061 0.079 0.060 0.035 0.043 0.064 
N 2,457 2,211 1,905 2,763 2,081 2,587 
NOTE: Each cell represents a point estimate and the standard error from a separate regression. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by individual are in parentheses; each observation is a person-year. The 
dependent variables vary by panel. “FRL” includes individuals who were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch in 
high school and indicates lower family income. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively. 




A.  UI Data Processing 
 
The UI data we received cover the period from the first quarter of 2006 through the first 
quarter of 2019 and contain one observation per individual per covered employer per calendar 
quarter. We collapse these data to the person-quarter data by summing earnings across employers 
(for individuals with more than one) within a given calendar quarter. (For ZIP code, we take the 
first mode across quarters.) Earnings are then adjusted to year 2018 dollars using the personal 
consumption expenditures deflator. We then merged these data to our education records (from 
Kalamazoo Public Schools, the Kalamazoo Promise, and the National Student Clearinghouse) 
using a linked student ID variable.  
 
Using timing of high school graduation, we convert earnings and ZIP code measures 
from a calendar-quarter basis to a quarters-elapsed-since-high-school-graduation basis. Because 
quarters in which an individual has no employment record are not present, we rectangularize the 
data by filling in these quarters (with implicit zeros) so that all quarters elapsed since high school 
(through the maximum shown in Table 2) are populated. (These filled-in quarters are also 
flagged, as their use varies based on construction of the chosen sample.) Although we observe 
the first quarter elapsed since high school graduation for the classes of 2006–2013, observations 
for the class of 2005 start with quarter 3, observations for the class of 2004 start with quarter 7, 
and observations for the class of 2003 start with quarter 11. 
 
The quarters-elapsed measures are then further collapsed to year-elapsed measures as 
described in the main text. 
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B.  Telephone Interview Instrument 
 
We are interested in learning about your employment experiences and really appreciate your help. 
 
We have a series of questions that will take roughly 15-20 minutes of your time. All reports that we 
generate from these questions and your answers will be presented in an aggregate format, meaning that 
all information gathered is strictly confidential (with our Upjohn Institute researcher team and Promise 
staff) and your name will never be mentioned in our reports.   
 
Thank you for your time and your input. 
 
1. Confirm high school graduation year 
 
2. In what city and state are you currently living? 
 
3. Where did you first attend college or receive training following your high school graduation? 
 
4. How did you decide to attend this college, apprenticeship, or trade school? (interview prompts if 
needed: using all that apply but highlight the most important factor): 
Proximity to home 
Farthest from home 
Attracted to a specific training program 
Friend or relative attends the school 
They offered a scholarship 
Wanted to play sports there 
Strong academic reputation 
Strong arts reputation 
Family legacy attendance 
Other _____________________ 
 






6. What was your undergraduate major or field of training at the time you finished or left your 
college or training program? 
 
7. Are you currently employed? If so, what is the name and industry of your employer and your job 
title? What is the city and state of your employment? How long have you worked here? 
 
8. Have you had other jobs since finishing college or your training program? If so, could you list 






9. Did you have any internships or other significant work experiences while in college? Please list 
the job title, employer, and location of each such experience. Dates of these experiences, i.e. 





10. How did you look for your first job after college/training? (Interview prompts: monster or other 
internet search, job boards, school placement office, family/friends, Facebook, prior work 
experience, etc.) 
 
How long after graduation did you get this first job? (prompts: did the process begin before you 
graduated from college? In the summer? Later?)  
 
How did you look for your current job, if it is different from your first job search? 
 
11. When you were searching for jobs, did you actively search for a job in or around Kalamazoo? 
 In Michigan? 
 
[If no, why not?] 
 
12. What were your top two reasons for taking your first job after college?  
 
Your current or most recent job (if different)? (Interview prompts: pay, interest fit, location, 
benefits, connection to prior work/internship). 
 
13. Thinking about your current or most recent employment, 
Do you consider this a full-time job? 
 
14. Remembering that all responses will remain anonymous and never be individually identified, 
what are your annual earnings from this job? 









15. Do you have any current plans to move?  
 
If so, where would you move?   
 





We are interested in expanding the number of KPS grads included in this study and would appreciate 
your help. Could you provide the name and contact information of 3 more people that you know that 





Thank you again for your time. Are there any questions that you have for me? 
 
As I move away from the confidential portion of my questions, I have one last question. The Kalamazoo 
Promise staff are reaching out to KPS graduates interested in being part of the Promise2Promise 
Network they are creating? This effort connects Promise alumni with Promise students to find jobs, 
internships and network, among other things. It will be on the LinkedIn platform. Would you be 
interested in them contacting you for the Promise2Promise Network? 
 
Name: 
Best contact method: 




Figure A1  Promise Effects on Earnings Distribution: High-Match Sample 
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D. 7–10 years post-high school graduation: Only matched person-quarters sample
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(std. err.) Eligibles Ineligibles Eligibles Ineligibles 
Demographics 
       
  Male 0.471 0.470 0.442 0.480 0.432 0.0206 (0.0423) 
  Black 0.411 0.346 0.481 0.403 0.581 −0.0436 (0.0421) 
  Asian 0.026 0.017 0.056 0.026 0.031 0.0339 (0.0174) 
  Hispanic 0.070 0.049 0.086 0.074 0.083 0.0277 (0.0231) 
  White 0.485 0.584 0.369 0.487 0.295 −0.0233 (0.0407) 
  Subsidized lunch 0.507 0.338 0.528 0.534 0.710 0.0130 (0.0413) 
  High school 1 0.513 0.491 0.399 0.530 0.507 −0.0685 (0.0420) 
  High school 2 0.403 0.446 0.373 0.401 0.325 0.0037 (0.0410)       
N 5,415 1,235 233 3,405 542     
NOTE: Authors’ calculations of characteristics of KPS graduates for classes of 2003 through 2013 (excluding 
alternative education). Eligibility calculated based on Promise rules. “Before” represents cohorts 2003 through 2005; 
“After” represents cohorts 2006 through 2013. “DD” represents the difference between eligibles after and before the 
Promise and ineligibles after and before the Promise. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses.  



















2003 442 55.7% 64.1% 83 44.6% 63.4% 
2004 448 60.0% 64.4% 103 50.5% 52.7% 
2005 345 58.0% 65.1% 47 51.1% 55.7% 
2006* 388 82.0% 62.7% 61 72.1% 59.3% 
2007 462 87.2% 62.3% 42 69.0% 56.4% 
2008 430 87.0% 63.2% 54 72.2% 67.6% 
2009 420 88.3% 66.5% 46 73.9% 65.7% 
2010 452 89.2% 63.4% 46 80.4% 57.1% 
2011 459 88.9% 65.4% 48 87.5% 69.2% 
2012 477 91.2% 68.5% 49 87.8% 61.0% 
2013 483 95.5% 68.1% 30 73.3% 67.8% 
Total 4,806 80.9%  609 66.2%  
NOTE: See notes to Table 2. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS and Michigan UI administrative data. 
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Table A3  Promise Effects on Employment (Attached Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample 
 1–3 years 4–6 years 7–10 years 
Panel A: ≥ 2 quarters 
   
 −0.0406 −0.0447 −0.0043 
 (0.0397) (0.0305) (0.0242) 
Mean dep. variable 0.798 0.886 0.917 
R2 0.012 0.013 0.007 
N 9,428 10,327 9,263 
Panel B: ≥ 3 quarters    
 −0.0426 −0.0582 0.0208 
 (0.0349) (0.0392) (0.0324) 
Mean dep. variable 0.370 0.783 0.841 
R2 0.077 0.016 0.012 
N 9,428 10,327 9,263 
Panel C: ≥ 4 quarters    
 −0.0358 −0.0295 0.0245 
 (0.0386) (0.0455) (0.0409) 
Mean dep. variable 0.292 0.632 0.741 
R2 0.051 0.033 0.148 
N 9,428 10,327 9,263 
NOTE: Each cell represents a point estimate and the standard error from a separate regression. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by individual are in parentheses; each observation is a person-year. The 
dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether an individual has positive earnings in at least the specified 
number of quarters (by panel) in a year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. Unlike Table 4, the sample here is conditioned on at least one matched quarter per year. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS, NSC, and Michigan UI administrative data. 
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Table A4  Promise Effects on Earnings Levels (Attached Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample 
 1–3 years 4–6 years 7–10 years 
Panel A: All person-quarters 
 −221.6 −356.8 472.1 
 (231.1) (305.7) (533.9) 
Mean dep. Variable 2416 3637 5964 
R2 0.049 0.033 0.053 
N 9,428 10,327 9,263 
Panel B: Only matched person-quarters 
 −112.8 −293.7 388.8 
 (233.5) (295.4) (538.9) 
Mean dep. Variable 2738 4029 6354 
R2 0.047 0.036 0.056 
N 9,428 10,327 9,263 
NOTE: Each cell represents a point estimate and the standard error from a separate regression. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by individual are in parentheses; each observation is a person-year. The 
dependent variable is the inflation-adjusted ($2018 PCE) average quarterly earnings of the individual in a year. 
Panel A uses a sample that treats missing person-quarters as implicit zeros, while panel B uses a sample that 
includes only matched person-quarters with positive earnings. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Unlike Table 5, the sample here is conditioned on at least one matched 
quarter per year. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS, NSC, and Michigan UI administrative data.  
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Table A5  Promise Effects on Location Choice (Attached Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample 
 1–3 years 4–6 years 7–10 years 
Panel A: ≤ 5 miles 
   
 0.090 0.135* 0.091 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.082) 
Mean dep. variable 0.601 0.583 0.584 
R2 0.043 0.049 0.053 
N 7,258 5,849 4,645 
Panel B: ≤ 10 miles    
 0.096* 0.170*** 0.120* 
 (0.059) (0.056) (0.066) 
Mean dep. variable 0.802 0.787 0.788 
R2 0.048 0.050 0.056 
N 7,258 5,849 4,645 
Panel C: ≤ 20 miles    
 0.063 0.153*** 0.112* 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.060) 
Mean dep. variable 0.852 0.836 0.836 
R2 0.037 0.036 0.042 
N 7,258 5,849 4,645 
Panel D: ≤ 50 miles    
 0.043 0.102** 0.078 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.049) 
Mean dep. variable 0.903 0.894 0.891 
R2 0.029 0.029 0.030 
N 7,258 5,849 4,645 
NOTE: Each cell represents a point estimate and the standard error from a separate regression. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by individual are in parentheses; each observation is a person-year. The 
dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the mode of an individual’s residential ZIP code in a year was 
within the specified distance (by panel) from Kalamazoo’s central business district. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Unlike Table 6, the sample here is conditioned on at 
least one matched quarter per year. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS, NSC, and Michigan UI administrative data. 
 
